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threatened to terminate the lease, the bank filed a claim and delivery action
to get possession of the diner. At the time, the plaintiffs had made twenty-two
of twenty-three monthly payments on their note. The bank ultimately dis-
posed of the diner and the plaintiffs brought the present action for abuse
of process. The trial court gave judgment to the debtors, awarding both
compensatory and punitive damages.
On appeal, the court reversed and remanded, holding that regardless of
whether the bank had waived the defaults in monthly payments, it still had
the power under the second part of the acceleration clause to precipitate the
maturity date if it deemed itself insecure. Under Section 1-208, the bank
could deem itself insecure only if it did so in good faith, and the burden
of proving bad faith was on the debtors. "Good faith" was defined by Sec-
tion 1-201(19) as "honesty in fact." The court found that as a matter of
law the bank had accelerated on a good faith belief that it was insecure
and that a reversal was in order. The bank had effectively pursued its
right to possession by judicial process, given it by Section 9-503.
The court pointed out, however, that the record did not contain an
adequate account of the disposition of the diner. Under Section 9-504(3),
the bank was required to dispose of it in a "commercially reasonable" man-
ner. If it disposed of it in any other way, it was liable under Section 9-507
for whatever loss the plaintiffs could show resulted from improper disposition.
P.J.N.
ARTICLE 2: SALES
SECTION 2-103. Definitions and Index of Definitions
O'BRIEN V. ISAACS
203 N.E.2d 890 (Ill. 1965)
Annotated under Section 2-106, infra.
SECTION 2-104. Definitions: "Merchant"; "Between Merchants";
"Financing Agency"
ASSOCIATED HARDWARE SUPPLY CO. V. BIG WHEEL DISTRIB. Co.
236 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Pa. 1965)
Annotated under Section 1-205, supra.
SECTION 2-106. Definitions: "Contract"; "Agreement";
"Contract for Sale"; "Sale"; "Present
Sale"; "Conforming" to Contract;
"Termination"; "Cancellation"
O'BRIEN V. IsAAcs
203 N.E.2d 890 (Ill. 1965)
This action was brought to test the constitutionality of Section 42 of
the Illinois Retail Sales Regulations which taxed payments received by
Illinois florists for flowers delivered in Illinois pursuant to telegraphic
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instructions from out of state florists. Section 42 is an administrative regula-
tion formulated by the Director of Revenue under authority of Chapter 120
of the Illinois Revenue Statute. This statute expressly exempts from the
tax goods sold for the purpose of resale. The plaintiff's first argument was that
the Illinois florist does not sell the goods at all, that he is not a seller or
agent but an independent contractor or bailee of the out of state florist. His
second argument was that, even if he does sell the goods, he sells them for
resale. That is to say, he sells them to the out of state florist who resells them
to the out of state customer. His third contention was that the tax places an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
In affirming a judgment in favor of the Director of Revenue, the Su-
preme Court of Illinois held that the delivery by the Illinois florist and the
consideration tendered him constituted a present sale of the flowers under
Sections 2-106(1), 2-401(1) and 2-206(1) (b) of the Uniform Commercial
Code, and that the Illinois florist was thus a seller under Section 2-103(1) (d).
Title passed in Illinois under Section 2-401(2) when the seller completed
his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods. The
court next rejected the plaintiff's contention that the sale was transacted
with the out of state florist for the purpose of resale. The out of state florist
performed only a service similar to that performed by an airline booking
a customer's passage on another airline. The out of state customer was the
sole buyer. Finally, the court held that the tax was not violative of the com-
merce clause. Two United States Supreme Court cases holding that a tax
on a sale to an out of state customer who comes into the state to receive the
goods for use out of state, were cited.
M.L.C.
SECTION 2-201. Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds
JULIAN C. COHEN SALVAGE CORP. V. EASTERN ELEC. SALES CO.
206 A.2d 331 (Pa. Super. 1965)
In the latter part of June, the defendant's employee came to the plain-
tiff's plant and after examining the cable in question, signed a sales order
which contained the name of the plaintiff, the name of the shipper, the
quantity, description and weight of the cable, and notations of the defendant's
order number and the plaintiff's sales number. The sales order did not
contain the price. Over 36,000 pounds of cable was then shipped to the
defendant's plant where it was run off onto the defendant's reels, taken by the
defendant's employees and placed in the defendant's warehouse, where it
still remains. Approximately one month later, after having received a letter
demanding payment from plaintiff's counsel, the defendant notified the
plaintiff that it was rejecting the cable. The plaintiff sued for the price which
was more than $7,000. The defendant argued, first, that there was no con-
tract, and second, that if there were one, it ran afoul of the statute of frauds.
At trial, the defendant's president testified that on June 29, his company
sent a purchase order to the plaintiff, which contained a statement that the
defendant would pay only for the cable it could use. The trial court ruled
that a contract existed and that it was enforceable.
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On appeal, affirmed. The sales order satisfied Section 2-201(1)(a), the
statute of frauds. The omission of the price was not fatal since, by the very
terms of the section, "a writing is not insufficient because it omits a term
agreed upon." The price could be proved by parol. The purchase order
sent by the defendant was found to be improperly addressed; thus there was
no presumption that it was received and it was of little probative value. Even
if the sales order did not satisfy subsection (I), the cable had been received
and accepted by the defendant; therefore, under subsection (3)(c), the
contract was enforceable. To the defendant's argument that it had not
accepted the goods but rejected them "shortly after the cable was received,"
the court answered that this was not credible; there was no rejection in
writing, the defendant still possessed the goods, and there was never any
offer or attempt to return them. Having failed to reject in the manner
prescribed by Section 2-602, the defendant accepted under Section 2-606.
COMMENT
The court's statements on the question of rejection are confusing. At
one point it states that notice of rejection was given approximately one
month after the cable was received; at another, that the defendant's testi-
mony that he gave the plaintiff notice of rejection "shortly after the cable
was received" was not credible. Whether the court considered the misad-
dressed purchase order on the question of rejection is unclear. Assuming that
the defendant did give notice approximately one month after delivery—the
notice does not, apparently, have to be formal—the question would normally
be whether such notice was given within a reasonable time. Section 2-602(1).
Under the facts of the present case, notice of rejection a month after
delivery probably did not come within a reasonable time.
It would have availed the defendant nothing to argue that it had revoked
its acceptance within a reasonable time under Section 2-608. Once having
received and accepted the cable, it would be precluded from arguing the
statute of frauds, under Section 2-201(3) (c).
G.E.F.
ASSOCIATED HARDWARE SUPPLY CO. V. BIG WHEEL DISTRIB. Co.
236 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Pa. 1965)
Annotated under Section 1-205, supra.
SECTION 2-202. Final Written Expression; Parol or Extrinsic
Evidence
ASSOCIATED HARDWARE SUPPLY CO. V. BIG WHEEL DISTRID. Co.
236 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Pa. 1965)
Annotated under Section 1-205, supra.
SECTION 2-204. Formation in General
ASSOCIATED HARDWARE SUPPLY CO. V. BIG WHEEL DISTRID. Co.
236 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Pa. 1965)
Annotated under Section 1-205, supra.
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SECTION 2-206. Offer and Acceptance in Formation of Contract
ASSOCIATED HARDWARE SUPPLY CO. V. BIG WHEEL DISTRIB. Co.
236 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Pa. 1965)
Annotated under Section 1-205, supra.
O'BRIEN V. ISAACS
203 N.E.2d 890 (Ill. 1965)
Annotated under Section 2-106, supra.
SECTION 2-208. Course of Performance or Practical Construction
ASSOCIATED HARDWARE SUPPLY CO. V. BIG WHEEL DISTRIB. Co.
236 F. Supp. 879 (W.D. Pa. 1965)
Annotated under Section 1-205, supra.
SECTION 2-315. Implied Warranty; Fitness for Particular
Purpose
DELTA OXYGEN CO. V. SCOTT
383 S.W.2d 885 (Ark. 1964)
Annotated under Section 2-318, infra.
SECTION 2-318. Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties
Express or Implied
CHAIRALUCE V. STANLEY WARNER MANAGEMENT CORP.
236 F. Supp. 385 (D. Conn. 1964)
The plaintiff fell on a stairway in a theater owned by the defendant
Stanley Corp. When the accident occurred, the plaintiff was wearing for the
first time a pair of new shoes which had been manufactured by the defendant
Wise Corp. and had been purchased by the plaintiff from the defendant
Spiegel Corp., a mail-order store. The plaintiff brought an action for
negligence against Stanley, Wise, and Spiegel and an action for breach of
warranty against Wise and Spiegel. With respect to the action for breach
of warranty against Wise, the manufacturer, the plaintiff simply alleged
that there was a breach of "the warranties and duties which were owed
to the plaintiff under the laws of the State of Connecticut." Wise moved
for an order dismissing this action for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. Specifically, Wise contended that absent allegations
of representations through advertising by which the plaintiff had been
misled, lack of privity between manufacturer and ultimate consumer barred
an action for breach of implied warranty.
In denying the motion, the court held that lack of privity between the
plaintiff and Wise was no defense to the plaintiff's action for breach of
implied warranty against Wise. First, the obvious trend of Connecticut law
was toward the complete demise of the defense of lack of privity. The pre-
Code case of Haman v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961), had
abolished the defense in actions for breach of express warranty. In enacting
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Section 2-318 of the Connecticut Uniform Commercial Code, the legislature
had abolished the defense as to three classes of persons. The case of Simpson
v. Powered Prods., Inc., 24 Conn. Super. 409 (1963), had even extended
warranty protection to the lessee of the original purchaser. Second, sound
public policy required that the defense be abolished in all actions for
breach of warranty against the manufacturer where the plaintiff used the
manufacturer's product in a way in which it was intended and was injured
as a result of a defect of which he was not aware.
COMMENT
See the Comment to Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, immediately infra.
R.G.K.
DELTA OXYGEN CO. v. SCOTT
383 S.W.2d 885 (Ark. 1964)
The plaintiff, employed as a welder by his brother, was using cylinders
of oxygen which his brother had purchased from the defendant, an oxygen
manufacturer. In preparing to use the second of these cylinders, the plaintiff
momentarily turned on and off the valve of the cylinder, allowing a small
amount of the oxygen to escape. He then attached to the valve his own
regulator, which was ultimately connected to an acetylene torch. When the
plaintiff turned on the oxygen valve again, an explosion occurred in the
regulator. The plaintiff was seriously burned and brought action against
the defendant for negligence and breach of implied warranty.
In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff and remanding for a new trial,
the court held, with respect to the warranty count, first, that there was no
substantial evidence of breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose under Section 2-315. The oxygen was supposed to increase
the heat of the flame, and there was no showing that the oxygen failed in this
purpose. Second, the absence of privity between the plaintiff and the
defendant was no defense to the action for breach of implied warranty.
Though the case of Nelson v. Armour Packing Co., 76 Ark. 352, 90 S.W.
288 (1905), had upheld the defense of lack of privity in breach of warranty
actions, the legislature had since that time abolished the defense as to the
family, household, and guests of the original purchaser by enacting Section
2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code and there was no sound reason why
warranty protection should not also be extended to the plaintiff, an employee
and servant of the original purchaser, who was using the product in the
course of his employment: Furthermore, the Nelson case was factually
distinguishable, involving a subpurchaser, not the employee of a purchaser.
In its eighth footnote, the court noted that in view of its holding, it
was unnecessary to discuss the plaintiff's contention that he was "in the
family of" his brother, the original purchaser, and thus immune, under
Section 2-318, from the defense of lack of privity.
COMMENT
1. Section 2-318 extends to members of the purchaser's family and
household and to guests in his home the same warranty protection which the
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purchaser himself receives by virtue of his contract of sale. However, Official
Comment 3 to Section 2-318 points out that as to all other third persons,
including subpurchasers, the Code is neutral and the developing case law
controlling. Thus Section 2-318 did not require in Delta Oxygen the exten-
sion of warranty protection to an employee of the purchaser, nor did it require
in Chairaluce the extension of such protection to a subpurchaser. But the
courts in both cases felt that Section 2-318 significantly reflected the trend
against the rule of privity and presaged further breakdown of the rule by
the courts.
2. From a common starting-point, the Delta Oxygen and Chairaluce
cases do not proceed the same distance. The court in Delta Oxygen strongly
emphasized that its holding was very narrow, breaking down the privity
requirement only as to employees of the purchaser. The Nelson case, up-
holding the doctrine of privity in`subpurchaser situations, was not overturned
but distinguished. In contrast, the court in the Chairaluce case completely
abolished the privity defense in actions for breach of warranty by a sub-
purchaser against a manufacturer.
See Chairaluce v. Stanley Warner Management Carp., directly supra.
R.G.K.
SECTION 2-401. Passing of Title; Reservation for
Security; Limited Application of
This Section
PARK COUNTY IMPLEMENT CO. V. CRAIG
397 P.2d 800 (Wyo. 1964)
The defendant, a resident of Wyoming, placed an order with the plain-
tiff in Cody, Wyoming, for a certain chassis-cab combination. The plaintiff
informed the defendant that it did not have the vehicle on hand, but that one
was available at the International Company in Billings, Montana. The de-
fendant took delivery of the vehicle at Billings, but did not receive a state-
ment of origin, a Montana certificate of title, or any evidence of title from
the International Company. The defendant then brought the vehicle 'to Cady,
Wyoming. Several days later, while the defendant was installing a hoist and
a dump bed on the vehicle, a fire destroyed it. During the period in
which the defendant had had possession of the vehicle, he had not re-
ceived a statement of origin or a Wyoming certificate of title from the
plaintiff. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for the pur-
chase price of the vehicle. In an effort to escape applicability of the Wyoming
Uniform Commercial Code, under which the question of title was irrelevant,
the defendant made three contentions: (1) that Montana law was applicable
and under the Montana motor vehicle code issuance of a certificate of owner-
ship was necessary to a completed sale; (2) that even if Wyoming law applied,
issuance of a certificate of title was necessary to a completed sale under the
Wyoming motor vehicle code; and (3) that the Wyoming Uniform Com-
mercial Code did not apply since a motor vehicle could not be classified as
"goods."
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In reversing a summary judgment for the defendant and ordering sum-
mary judgment to be entered for the plaintiff, the court held, first, that the
Wyoming Uniform Commercial Code was applicable. A motor vehicle did
constitute "goods" to which the Code was applicable, and Section 1-105, the
conflict-of-laws provision, required the application of Wyoming, not Montana,
law. The delivery at Billings, Montana, constituted a minor part of the trans-
action; the transaction as a whole bore the necessary "appropriate relation"
to Wyoming. Second, since the Wyoming Commercial Code was applicable,
the defendant was liable for the contract price of the vehicle under Section
2-607(1), having accepted it under Section 2-606(1). The fact that the
plaintiff may not have had legal title to the truck because there was no
issuance of a certificate of title was irrelevant under Section 2-401.
COMMENT
1. Where a transaction upon which an action is brought in a Code
state bears some relation to the Code state and other jurisdictions and
where the parties have failed to agree as to which state law should govern,
the relevant question is: does the transaction bear an appropriate relation
to the Code state? If it does, then the Iaw of the Code state applies, and the
answer in each case is left for judicial decision. As Official Comment 3 to
Section 1-105 indicates, application of the Code "may be justified by its
comprehensiveness, by the policy of uniformity, and by the fact that it is in
large part a reformulation and restatement of the law merchant and of the
understanding of a business community which transcends state and even
national boundaries." However, this list does not purport to be all-inclusive.
The court in the instant case appears to have relied on the "totality of the
transaction" guide-line, which was suggested by Judge Herbert F. Goodrich,
Chairman of the Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code, in
Conflicts Niceties and Commercial Necessities, 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 199, 206.
Compare Atlas Credit Corp. v. Dolbow, 193 Pa. Super. 649, 165 A.2d 704
(1960), and especially Skinner v. Tober Foreign Motors, Inc., 345 Mass.
429, 187 N.E.2d 669 (1963).
2. The court correctly held that the issuance of a certificate of title was
irrelevant to the question of whether a completed sale had been made under
the Code. Under Section 2-401, the rights and obligations of the parties do
not depend on title. Accord, Semple v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 215
F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1963). However, the court failed to cite Sections
2-509, 2-510 and 2-709 which specifically deal with risk of loss. Section
2-509(3) provides ".. . the risk of loss passes to the buyer on his receipt of
the goods if the seller is a merchant. . ," and Section 2-709(1)(a) provides
"When the buyer fails to pay the price as it becomes due the seller may
recover . • the price of goods accepted or of conforming goods lost or
damaged within a commercially reasonable time after risk of their loss has
passed to the buyer.. .."
R.G.K.
O'BRIEN V. ISAACS
203 N.E.2d 890 (Ill. 1965)
Annotated under Section 2-106, supra.
780
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANNOTATIONS
SECTION 2-509. Risk of Loss in the Absence of Breach
PARK COUNTY IMPLEMENT CO. V. CRAIG
397 P.2d 800 (Wyo. 1964)
Annotated under Section 2-401, supra.
SECTION 2-602. Manner and Effect of Rightful Rejection
JULIAN C. COHEN SALVAGE CORP. V. EASTERN ELEC. SALES CO.
206 A.2d 331 (Pa. Super. 1965)
Annotated under Section 2-201, supra.
SECTION 2-606. What Constitutes Acceptance of Goods
JULIAN C. COHEN SALVAGE CORP. V. EASTERN ELEC. SALES Co.
206 A.2d 331 (Pa. Super. 1965)
Annotated under Section 2-201, supra.
PARK COUNTY IMPLEMENT CO. V. CRAIG
397 P.2d 800 (Wyo. 1964)
Annotated under Section 2-401, supra.
SECTION 2-607. Effect of Acceptance; Notice of Breach; Burden
of Establishing Breach After Acceptance;
Notice of Claim or Litigation to
Person Answerable Over
G. VANDENBERG & SONS, N.V. V. SITER
204 Pa. Super 392, 204 A.2d 494 (1964)
The defendant purchased flower bulbs from the plaintiff, a Holland
grower. The contract stated that the "seller warrants the goods to be sound
and healthy at the time of shipment but does not otherwise warrant flower-
ing or other planting, growing or forcing results. . . All claims hereunder
shall be deemed waived unless presented within eight (8) days after receipt
of the goods." A month after the bulbs were delivered a defect was dis-
covered in some of the bulbs, which were destroyed. The defect in the rest
of the bulbs was not discovered until many months afterwards at a time
when the trade customarily inspected its bulbs. At this time notice of breach
was given. When the defendant refused to pay further on the contract, the
plaintiff brought this action for the balance. The defendant counterclaimed
for damages for breach of express and implied warranties. The trial court
struck from the record all testimony offered by the defendant to show breach
of warranty, so far as it related to the condition of the bulbs more than
eight days after delivery.
On appeal, the court found that the plaintiff expressly warranted that
the bulbs would be sound and healthy at the time of shipment and that this
express warranty was not inconsistent with and did not exclude the implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. The
defendant was required, however, to give notice of breach and notice of
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revocation within a reasonable time after discovering the breach under
Sections 2-607 and 2-608. Section 1-204 permitted the parties to fix in
their contract a reasonable time for giving such notice so long as the time
agreed upon was reasonable; but where, as here, as to latent defects, the
agreed upon time was manifestly unreasonable, it was for the jury to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff had given notice within a reasonable time. The
lower court erred in striking defendant's offer of proof and much of its
evidence. A new trial was required. Consequently, judgments for the plain-
tiff on the claim and counterclaim were reversed.
G.E.F.
PARK COUNTY IMPLEMENT CO. V. CRAIG
397 P.2d 800 (Wyo. 1964)
Annotated under Section 2-401, supra.
SECTION 2-608. Revocation of Acceptance in Whole or
in Part
G. VANDENBERG & SONS, N.V. v. SITER
204 Pa. Super. 392, 204 A.2d 494 (1964)
Annotated under Section 2-607, supra.
SECTION 2-709. Action for the Price
PARK COUNTY IMPLEMENT CO. V. CRAIG
397 P.2d 800 (Wyo. 1964)
Annotated under Section 2-401, supra.
SECTION 2-718. Liquidation or Limitation of Damages;
Deposits
BETHLEHEM STEEL CO. V. CITY OF CHICAGO
234 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Ill. 1964)
Bethlehem Steel Co. contracted to complete structural steel work on a
Chicago superhighway within a certain period of time, the contract expressly
stating that time was of the essence. " [L] iquidated damages, not a penalty"
were set at $1000 for each day of delay, "to partially cover losses and
expenses to the City." Recovery was to be made "by deducting the amount
thereof out of any moneys due or that may become due the Contractor."
Despite Bethlehem's own 52-day tardy performance, the highway was com-
pleted on time by the many contractors involved. When the City withheld
$52,000 that would otherwise have been due it, Bethlehem sued, claiming
that since the highway was completed on time, the City of Chicago had
sustained no loss and could not withhold the funds. The court held that
the City could retain the $52,000, the consensus being in favor of upholding
and enforcing provisions for liquidated damages "where it was reasonable
at the time of making the contract to so contract." [Emphasis court's.] The
fact that no actual damages occurred was irrelevant. In coming to this con-
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clusion the court quoted Section 2-718 which codifies the generally accepted
rule.
G.E.F.
SECTION 2-725. Statute of Limitations in Contracts for Sale
NATALE V. UP JOHN CO,
236 F. Supp. 37 (D. DeI. 1964)
In April of 1960, upon advice of her physician, the plaintiff was admin-
istered drugs in Pennsylvania manufactured by the defendant. Shortly there-
after she suffered a blurring of vision which she continued to suffer when
she brought this action in Delaware for breach of warranty, just short of
four years later. The parties assumed that the cause of action arose in
Pennsylvania. The defendant-manufacturer moved to dismiss on the ground
that the Delaware "borrowing statute" was applicable, that that statute
prescribed the use of the shorter of the Delaware or out-of-state statute of
limitations when an action was brought by a non-resident on an out-of-state
cause of action, and that the Delaware statute of limitations had run. The
plaintiff contended that the "borrowing statute" applied to out-of-state stat-
utes of limitations which were procedural only and not to those which, like
Section 2-725 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code, were sub-
stantive, i.e., integrated with, or built into, a statute creating a right or
liability. The court, however, without ruling on the validity of the plaintiff's
supposition, held that Section 2-725 was not substantive but procedural.
It reasoned, first, that the few cases in which a period of limitations had
been held a part of the right itself involved statutes which created a new
right or new liability and at the same time limited the time within which
the new right could be enforced. The Pennsylvania legislature, however, did
not create a new right or liability since actions for breach of warranty were
allowed in Pennsylvania both under the common law and the Uniform Sales
Act; they were not newly created by the Uniform Commercial Code. Second,
the fact that the four-year period of limitations was applicable to "breach
of any contract for sale" seemed to mean that the Pennsylvania legislature
did not give special consideration to the impact of the period of limitations
upon the particular right involved as distinguished from the other rights to
which the article is also applicable. Third, it was doubtful that the Pennsyl-
vania court would deem Section 2-725 a substantive statute of limitations
in view of the fact that it had acknowledged that rights under the Pennsyl-
vania Wrongful Death Act were unknown before passage but rejected the
argument that the newness of the right caused the statute of limitations to
be regarded as anything but procedural.
G.E.F.
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